Strategic Buyers and Market Entry by Lisa Bruttel & Jochen Glöckner




Thurgau Institute of Economics and Department of Economics
at the University of Konstanz
No. 44     july 2009
Predatory Pricing, Recoupment, and
Consumers’ ReactionPredatory Pricing, Recoupment, and Consumers’
Reaction
Lisa V. Bruttel∗ Jochen Gl¨ ockner†
December 2, 2009
Abstract
This paper tests two basic assumptions underlying court made or statutory
provisions prohibiting predatory pricing. Such prohibitions are usually based
on the economic grounds that monopolistic pricing is likely to occur in the
long run, causing harm to competition and consumers. The ﬁrst assumption
under scrutiny is that customers will accept monopolistic prices during the
subsequent phase of recoupment, even though they have become accustomed
to low prices during the price war. The second assumption is that no competi-
tor will (re-)enter the market in this subsequent phase. Our two experiments
indicate that both assumptions are not backed up by actual decision making
both of consumers and of competitors. Moreover, we ﬁnd that consumers use
their market power in order to maintain long-run competition.
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Predatory pricing describes the behavior of an incumbent ﬁrm setting prices below
marginal costs or some other measure of costs in order to drive a competing ﬁrm
out of the market or to deter its entry in advance. Where jurisdictions resort to
straightforward prohibitions of predatory pricing, such prohibitions are usually based
on the concept that the incumbent is ultimately able to recoup the costs of the
price war, thus causing harm to consumers and competition. However, recoupment
will in fact only be possible if two further conditions are met: First, consumers,
accustomed to low predatory prices, have to accept monopolistic prices afterwards.
Second, neither the competitor having left the market, nor any other entrant ﬁrm
must (re-)enter the market. Both requirements are tacitly assumed by jurisdictions
prohibiting predatory pricing without a requirement of likelihood of recoupment.
Yet, both assumptions seem questionable from an experimental as well as from an
industrial organization perspective and will therefore be tested in this paper.
There is a general convergence in the worldwide development of competition law in
the recognition that the primary goal of competition law is the protection of the
competitive process as the core of any market driven economy. Furthermore it is
fairly safe to say that the protection of consumers is though not necessarily the
primary, yet the ultimate goal of competition law. Competitors, on the other hand,
may well and will undeniably beneﬁt from the protection of the competitive process,
but competition law does not protect competitors by themselves.1 Straightforward
prohibitions of predatory pricing as described above seem to challenge these princi-
ples: To the contrary - at least in the short run predatory pricing in fact increases
the consumers’ surplus, whereas only competitors are suﬀering. Consequently, pro-
hibitions of predatory pricing can be justiﬁed only by making the long run eﬀects,
including the predator’s recoupment of the costs of the price war which ultimately
1For U.S. Competition Law cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962); for
EU Competition Law cf. the Communication from the Commission of 2-9-2009, Guidance on the
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary
conduct by dominant undertakings, COM (2009) 864 ﬁnal, at para. 6.
1prejudices consumers’ interests, part of the equation. In other words: The systemic
justiﬁcation of such prohibitions depends upon the possibility and likelihood of re-
coupment:2 If predatory pricing almost always resulted in a monopolistic market
structure yielding sustained monopoly proﬁts, a per se prohibition would certainly
be appropriate. If, however, many or most predatory pricing policies actually failed
in the real world, better arguments would have to be forwarded to support these pro-
hibitions. Jurisdictions are split in their assessments: While the European Courts3
and German competition law like many other competition law regimes endorse plain
prohibitions of predatory pricing without a requirement of establishing a likelihood
of recoupment, U.S Antitrust Law ﬁnds an unlawful monopolization only, if the
plaintiﬀ can demonstrate that there is a likelihood that the predatory scheme al-
leged would cause a rise in prices above a competitive level that would be suﬃcient
to compensate for the amounts expended on the predation, including the time value
of the money invested in it.4 Currently, we can diagnose almost a line of demar-
cation separating the globe concerning the question: ’Is predatory pricing likely to
be successful in terms of recoupment?’ The experiment in this paper is designed to
help answer this question so crucial for competition policy and enforcement all over
the world.
Predatory pricing can be attractive for an incumbent when there are several potential
entrants. Assuming asymmetric information, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) show
that predation against early entrants might be rational for the incumbent to build a
reputation in order to deter later entrants. Isaac and Smith (1985) are the ﬁrst trying
to reproduce predatory pricing in an experiment. They come to the conclusion that
predation does not occur in the laboratory, even under very favorable circumstances.
Harrison (1988), in contrast, ﬁnds evidence for predatory pricing in the laboratory in
2This is stated very clearly for the European competition law in the Communication from the
Commission of 2-9-2009, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, COM (2009) 864
ﬁnal, at para. 70.
3The European Court of Justice explicitly repeated on several occasions that there is no need
of recoupment to prohibit sale under costs: ECJ, Case C-333/94 P - Tetra Pak II, [1996] ECR
I-5951 at para. 44; Case C-202/07 P - France T´ elecom, (2009), not yet reported) at para. 110.
4Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993).
2a multiple market experiment with eleven sellers acting in ﬁve markets. Jung et al.
(1994) use a diﬀerent, very simple design with weak and strong types of incumbent
monopolists. Weak monopolists have an incentive to pretend to be strong in order
to deter entry in the long run. Their results show that weak incumbents in fact ﬁght
entry in early periods. Capra et al. (2000) report on a classroom teaching experiment
which uses a facilitated version of Harrison’s multi-market experiment, ﬁnding mixed
evidence regarding incumbents’ strategies. Gomez et al. (2008) provide a summary
of the diﬀerent experimental results.
Although predatory pricing in general is a relatively well-studied ﬁeld in the ex-
perimental industrial organization literature, consumer’s behavior in these markets
has to the best of our knowledge never been explicitly studied. Their reaction
to the incumbent’s early predatory and later monopolistic pricing, however, is of
great importance for the incumbent’s strategy. If consumers are unlikely to pay
monopoly prices in the later periods of the game, recoupment is unlikely as well.
Thus, an informed and rational monopolist might abstain from predatory pricing
right from the beginning of the game. The results of fairness experiments show-
ing that subjects reciprocate unkind behavior if they feel treated unfairly (Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006), make consumers’ willingness to pay monopoly prices appear par-
ticularly questionable. Consumers might even be trying to punish the monopolist
for the treatment of the entrant, which they observe from the outside and per-
ceive as unfair (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Previous studies on predatory pricing
usually simulated demand as a numerical function without taking such behavioral
motives into account. Our study aims at closing this gap by having both market
sides explicitly played by participants in the experiment.
Let us next consider the second assumption of law that other ﬁrms will stay out
of the incumbent’s market after the predatory pricing phase. From a theoretical
industrial organization perspective there are good reasons that the monopolistic
situation would not last long, if proﬁtable market entry was possible in the long
run. The monopolist cannot aﬀord ﬁghting entry in every period, thus, by backward
induction market entry will occur from the beginning on. From a behavioral point of
view, however, we might argue that the incumbent’s threat has long lasting eﬀects as
3in Selten’s (1978) chain store game, if the threat is strong enough. There are already
some experimental results regarding the reactions of displaced entrants. Capra et
al. (2000) report the results from a classroom experiment where they found very
diﬀerent behavior across markets. In their experiment, incumbents only sometimes
reach a monopoly position. Our experiment wants to generate additional insights
into the reactions of entrants to predatory prices.
We conduct two experimental studies indicating that both assumptions cannot be
conﬁrmed by actual decision making both of consumers and of competitors. Com-
petitors re-enter into the incumbents’ markets again and again, and consumers re-
duce their demand in order to make to incumbent reduce prices in the future. More-
over, we ﬁnd explicit evidence how consumers use their market power in order to
maintain competition in the long run.
In section 2 of this paper, we present the market models we use in the experiment.
The experimental protocol is described in section 3 along with some behavioral
predictions. Section 4 presents the main ﬁndings and section 5 concludes.
2 Design
Our study comprises two diﬀerent experimental studies. The ﬁrst one is a multi-
market design similar to Capra et al. (2000), while the second one is a simpliﬁed
version of this model with ﬁrms interacting in only one market and a simpler cost
and demand structure.
In the ﬁrst part of our study, we use a design with three markets (treatment 3Mar-
kets). In each of the three markets there is one consumer. There is one ﬁxed
incumbent ﬁrm in two of the three markets, whereas in the third market no ﬁrm is
present by default. In the beginning of each round, four mobile sellers decide in a
random sequential order which market to enter.
4Some modiﬁcations of the experimental design of Capra et al. (2000) are imple-
mented: Most important we replace the simulated demand function of Capra et al.
(2000) with human players of the consumers and induce consumers’ willingness to
pay with resale values according to their demand function. We then normalize cost
and demand functions to avoid the possibility of excessive losses. The mobile sellers
are made a little more agressive and dangerous for the ﬁxed sellers by an increased
production capacity.5 We then adjust the demand function to reach a similar com-
petitive equilibrium. Finally, we extend the duration of the experiment from 10 to












Figure 1: Cost and Demand Structure
Figure 1 summarizes the cost and demand structure in our experiment. Fixed sellers
can sell up to 10 units and mobile sellers can sell up to 5 units. Marginal costs for
5This ﬁnal modiﬁcation seemed meaningful, after a pilot experiment had not generated preda-
tory behavior of the ﬁxed sellers. However, it did not help enhancing predatory pricing. It did not
change market behavior at all, except the mobile sellers lowering their prices in each of the three
markets, which does not seem to have an impact on the fundamental strategies of the three types
of market participants, however. Therefore, we include the pre-test with lower capacities of the
mobile sellers into the analysis as well.
5a ﬁxed seller are 10 for the ﬁrst 7 units and 40 for another 3 units. For a mobile
seller marginal costs are 30 for the ﬁrst 4 units and 80 for the 5th unit produced.
Consumers’ willingness to pay is induced with a three-step function of resale values:
the ﬁrst 6 units are worth 105 points, another 5 units are worth 35 points, and two
more units are worth 10 points. Fixed sellers receive an initial payment of 400 points
to cover eventual losses if they choose prices below their own marginal costs in the
very beginning of the experiment. Mobile sellers and consumers do not receive a
show-up fee.
The timing in each round of the game is as follows. First mobile ﬁrms select in
random order which market to enter. Each entrant is informed about the previous
entry decisions of the other mobile ﬁrms in this round before deciding itself. In
a second step all sellers and buyers are informed about the market choices of the
mobile sellers. Then, ﬁxed and mobile sellers decide simultaneously about the price
they would like to set in the current round and the maximum quantity they are
willing to sell at this price. They only have to bear costs for the units they actually
sell, there are no capacity installation costs. Consumers are informed about the
oﬀers of all ﬁrms in their market and can decide how many units to buy from which
ﬁrm. We, thus, relax the assumption of eﬃcient rationing that was made in Capra
et al. (2000). Each consumer can buy up to 13 units per round.
In this experiment, consumers have a very strong market position as there is only
one consumer in each market deciding between buying at diﬀerent competing sell-
ers. This will cause some interesting behavioral patterns worth to be studied a little
closer. In a second experiment, we therefore focus on consumers’ decision making
depending on their market power. In this second experiment, we use a simpler mar-
ket design comprising only the main features of the ﬁrst one. The main diﬀerence to
the ﬁrst experiment is that we now compare markets with only one buyer (treatment
1Buyer) and markets with two buyers (treatment 2Buyers) to see whether buyers’
market power was crucial for their decisions in the ﬁrst experiment. The remaining
details are as follows: buyers are again identical and there are two diﬀerent types of
sellers. The markets, in which groups of buyers and sellers are interacting, are ﬁxed.
In each market, there is one low-cost sellers by default and either one buyer or two
6buyers. In each round, the high-cost seller can decide whether to enter the market.
If the high-cost seller does not enter, he receives a ﬁxed payoﬀ s = 60 roughly equal
to the average earnings of mobile sellers in the ﬁrst experiment. We restrict cost
and demand functions to the ﬁrst six units of those in the ﬁrst experiment, because
only very few trades in the ﬁrst experiment included more than six units. Finally,
we further extend the capacity of the high-cost sellers to six units so that we do
not need to deﬁne a procedure how to proceed if aggregate demand for one seller in
the two-buyer treatment exceeds supply. All participants in the second experiment
receive a show-up fee of 4 euros.
3 Experiment
3.1 Procedures
For the 3Markets experiment, we have observations from nine experimental match-
ing groups with nine market participants each: two incumbent ﬁrms, four potential
entrants, and three consumers. For the second experiment, we have eight obser-
vations for 1Buyer markets and ten observations for 2Buyer markets. The in-
formation provided to the participants in our experiment imitates the information
sets of real ﬁrms and consumers. The ﬁxed sellers have complete information about
consumers’ demand and all ﬁrms’ costs reﬂecting their maximum market power and
their incumbent status with experience in the market. The mobile sellers are new
entrants in the market, they only know their own costs.6 Consumers know their
willingness to pay, but not the ﬁrms’ costs.
The experiments were computerized using Fischbacher’s (2007) z-tree software. A
total of 145 subjects participated in the experiments, 55 as buyers, 36 as (ﬁxed)
low-cost sellers, and 54 as (mobile) high-cost sellers. Subjects were students of
the University of Konstanz recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiment
6In the second experiment, they also know the buyers’ willingness to pay.
7took place in lakelab, the laboratory for experimental economics at the University of
Konstanz. All sessions lasted less than two hours. Before the experiment, subjects
received instructions about the experiment. After the actual experiment participants
ﬁlled out a short questionnaire.7
3.2 Behavioral predictions
Let us start with our predictions regarding the decision making in the ﬁrst experi-
ment. In the one-shot game the competitive market equilibrium would be achieved
at a price between 30 and 35 and a traded quantity of 11, with the ﬁxed seller
trading 7 units and the mobile seller trading 4 units. In the competitive case a ﬁxed
seller makes a proﬁt in the range of [140;175] and a mobile seller makes a proﬁt in
the range of [0;20]. As a monopolist the ﬁxed seller will sell 6 units at a price of
105, yielding a proﬁt of 570. The collusive equilibrium in all markets also yields an
industry proﬁt of 570.
Fixed sellers will set the monopoly price if no entry occurs. If another ﬁrm enters the
market, the ﬁxed ﬁrm can either accommodate or ﬁght entry. If it accommodates,
it can set a price of 79 selling at least two units due to the entrant’s capacity limit,
and thereby make a proﬁt of 138 points at minimum. If it ﬁghts the entrant in order
to deter further entry, it will set a competitive price below the marginal cost of the
mobile sellers of 30. This restricts the mobile seller to sell no more than one unit
with a negligible proﬁt of 5 points at maximum.
Rational and selﬁsh consumers will buy every unit at a price below their willingness
to pay, starting with the cheapest available oﬀer. However, diﬀerent categories of
social preferences suggest that in the real world they might refuse to pay relatively
high prices. In particular, we assume that they might buy less than 6 units at the
monopoly price, if they experienced lower prices in the past.
7An english translation of the instructions is available from the authors upon request.
8Hypothesis 1 Consumers buy qt < 6 units from the incumbent ﬁrm in round t, if
the incumbent is a monopolist and pt >p t−1.
Buying less from an expensive incumbent monopolist implies that consumers ab-
stain from payoﬀs they could get today in order to increase their expected payoﬀs
tomorrow due to lower future prices. In rounds, in which not only the incumbent,
but also another seller is present in the market, a similar reasoning might make con-
sumers intentionally pay a higher price to the low-cost seller. Buying from the more
expensive high-cost seller increases the likelihood that this seller enters the market
again in future rounds, hoping to sell some units to this buyer again. Competition
then has a disciplining eﬀect on the prices of a low-cost seller, who otherwise would
have enjoyed monopolistic market power. Thus, a consumer buying today from an
expensive high-cost seller again increases expected payoﬀs tomorrow.
This eﬀect, however, depends crucially on the number of buyers in the market.
In our ﬁrst experiment, we have only one buyer per market. This consumer has
strong incentives to make the mobile seller enter the market again in the future,
because he himself fully beneﬁts from future seller competition. With two buyers in
one market, as implemented in the second experiment, the picture changes: losses
today still only have an impact on the consumer himself while lower prices in the
future now also beneﬁt the other consumers. Due to this externality, we might
expect that consumers buying from a more expensive high-cost seller become rare
if there are other buyers in the market. This question is the major focus of our
second experiment, where we compare markets with one buyer and markets with
two buyers.
Mobile sellers can decide if they want to compete with a ﬁxed seller in market I or
II or whether they want to enter the ’exit’ market III, where they meet up to three
other mobile sellers. If the mobile sellers expect predatory prices by a ﬁxed seller,
whenever they enter market I or II, they should resort to market III. However, if
they do not manage to collude,8 only two mobile sellers can make positive proﬁts in
8Note that collusion is unlikely in markets with three or four sellers, see Huck et al. (2004).
9this market. Since market III is thus too small for all four mobile sellers to enter,
there is a considerable incentive for at least one or two mobile sellers to try entry
into markets I and II. From a behavioral perspective, inequity averse mobile sellers
might also become envious if they realize that the incumbents make high proﬁts
whenever they are in a monopoly position. Be entering into the market, the mobile
sellers can reduce their disadvantageous income diﬀerence to the ﬁxed seller. We
therefore expect that mobile ﬁrms will repeatedly enter into markets I and II, even
if they experienced predatory prices in the past.
Hypothesis 2 Mobile ﬁrms cannot be squeezed out of a market permanently by the
ﬁxed ﬁrm.
To test whether repeated market entry even after predatory prices is not only an
artifact of our experimental design forcing mobile sellers to enter the ﬁxed sellers’
markets again and again because they cannot survive in market III, we used a
diﬀerent outside option for the mobile sellers in the second experiment. Here, they
have the opportunity to receive a risk-neutral alternative payoﬀ if they decide to
stay out of the ﬁxed seller’s market. This alternative payoﬀ is a little higher than
the expected proﬁt in case of entry, such that risk-neutral and risk-averse high-cost
sellers should never enter the market. Our second experiment therefore provides a
robustness check for mobile sellers’ market entry decisions.
4 Results
The results of the ﬁrst experiment reﬂect the complex structure of the multimarket
design with explicitly modelled supply and demand side with market conduct being
much more diﬀerentiated than one simple theory might predict. We observe a wide
variety of strategies of all three types of market participants. Nevertheless, actual
behavior and the answers given by the participants in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire clearly demonstrate that the diﬀerent strategies follow an underlying logic
10in accordance with the rules of the game.9 Table 1 summarizes the average payoﬀs
in euros of buyers and sellers in both experiments.
Treatment Buyer Fixed Seller Mobile Seller
3Markets 30.88 21.70 6.23
(7.76) (5.90) (3.33)
1Buyer 26.58 23.57 4.90
(6.73) (7.36) (1.20)
2Buyers 17.18 18.74 5.23
(2.77) (4.78) (1.37)
Table 1: Average payoﬀs (in euros), excluding showup fees. Standard deviation in parentheses.
4.1 Predatory Pricing
We start with the analysis of the ﬁxed sellers’ behavior in the ﬁrst experiment.
Their decision space in very similar in both experiments. Accordingly, results do
not diﬀer much.10 For a detailed comparison of low-cost sellers’ behavior in the two
experiments see Table 2.
First of all, our ﬁndings are in line with previous research rarely exposing evidence
for the existence of predatory prices.11 Predatory pricing according to the deﬁnition
of prices below marginal costs occurs very rarely in the experiment. Although the
experimental design facilitates predatory prices, the ﬁxed ﬁrms also set prices below
the mobiles’ marginal costs only in exceptional cases. Only 17% of the ﬁxed sellers
in the ﬁrst experiment ever chose a price below the mobile sellers’ marginal costs.
9We explicitly asked participants in the post-experimental questionnaire whether they perceived
the instructions as being comprehensible and 98 percent of them agreed that this was the case.
10There is only one surprising diﬀerence between the experimental treatments 1Buyer and
2Buyers: prices of the low-cost sellers are signiﬁcantly lower when there are two buyers in the
market (pLowCost =5 0 .92) than when they is only one buyer pLowCost = 62.87 (Wilcoxon rank
sum test, p − value =0 .0058). We would have expected the opposite, that lower market power of
two buyers leads to higher rather than lower prices. We do not have an explanation for this.
11See Gomez et al. (2008).
113Markets 1Buyer 2Buyers
pMonopolist 73.12 79.41 56.34
pCompetition 51.96 48.39 46.88
qMonopolist, p ≥ 90 4.13 4.14 4.50
qMonopolist, p<90 5.76 5.26 5.47
Low-cost ever set p ≥ 100? 27.8% 50.0% 30.0%
Low-cost ever set p ≤ 35? 55.6% 87.5% 70.0%
Table 2: Low-Cost Sellers Prices and Quantities (in Points).
Nevertheless, ﬁxed sellers obviously condition their prices on their relative position
in the market. Their prices are signiﬁcantly higher when they enjoy a monopolistic
position than when they have to share the market (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
p−value < 0.0001). Higher prices of monopolists are also reﬂected in higher proﬁts.
Interestingly though, ﬁxed sellers only very rarely (in less than 2% of their decisions)
set a price of 100 or more. Even when they are in a monopoly position, their prices
are still far below consumers’ induced willingness to pay, which is known to the ﬁxed
sellers. We think that such moderate prices are driven by similar motives like the
proposers in an ultimatum game which oﬀer almost half of the pie to the responder.12
Fixed sellers are fair minded as well as anticipating that consumers would not be
willing to pay very high prices.13
4.2 Entrants’ Strategies
The mobile ﬁrms are the poor dogs in this experiment. Equipped with a disad-
vantageous cost function and a lower production capacity than the ﬁxed ﬁrms, they
cannot seriously compete with them. Furthermore, there are too many mobile sellers
to realize satisfying payoﬀs in the ’exit’ market III.
12See Chapter 2 in Camerer (2003).
13This explanation for such moderate pricing anecdotically occurs also in the participants’ an-
swers in the questionnaire.
12Referring to hypothesis 2 we ﬁnd that low prices of the incumbent only have an
eﬀect for one round. Since predatory pricing in its strict deﬁnition occurs rarely in
the experiment, we broaden the deﬁnition of what a low price is to all prices that are
at or below 35, plow = {p|p ≤ 35}.14 We then compare the number of competitors
of a ﬁxed seller in rounds with p>35 in the current and the two preceeding rounds
to the number of competitors in rounds where the ﬁxed seller set p ≤ 35 one or two
rounds before. If a ﬁxed seller set p ≤ 35 in several subsequent rounds, we consider
the mobile seller’s reaction in the two rounds after the last round of the series with
p ≤ 35. The number of competitors an incumbent ﬁrm faces in round t+1 after the
last low price pt is Nt+1 =0 .27, compared to N =0 .90 competitors in rounds where
the incumbents did not choose a low price in the current and the two preceeding
rounds (see Figure 2). Only one round later the diﬀerence between the numbers of
competitors in situations with and without preceeding low prices almost completely
disappears.









tt + 1 t + 2
p(t) > 35 p(t) ! 35
Figure 2: Number of Entrants Before and After Low Prices of the Incumbent in 3Markets.
Result 1 Incumbents cannot push entrants out of the market for more than one
round.
14From the experimental data we observe that 35 seems to be a lower bound of mobile sellers’
prices. Such a lower bound might be driven by a predetermined minimum proﬁt goal of the mobile
sellers.
13As explained in the behavioral predictions, this results could be seen as an artifact of
our experimental design, providing mobile sellers no actual alternative to repeated
entry into market I or II in the ﬁrst experiment as competition in market III is too
strong to make reasonable proﬁts there. In the second experiment, we therefore
introduce a ﬁxed alternative payoﬀ s = 60 which low-cost sellers can get in each
round if they decide not to enter the low-cost seller’s market. The amount of s
matches the mobile sellers’ average proﬁts in the ﬁrst experiment. We ﬁnd that this
riskless alternative does not prevent market entry. Even though average proﬁts of
low-cost sellers in case of market entry are remarkably lower than s (34.92 in 1Buyer
and 39.23 in 2Buyers), they repeatedly choose to enter. However, we also see that
the number of entrants is decreasing over time in the 1Buyer treatment, but not
in the 2Buyers treatment of the second experiment (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Number of Entrants in both Treatments of the Second Experiment
In an OLS regression we test for the duration of the deterring eﬀect of incumbents’
low prices. We combine the entry data from the three treatments, using two dummy
variables indicating whether an observation originates from the ﬁrst or from the
second experiment and whether one or two buyers are present in the market. In
the regression, we explain the number of entrants as a function of the prices of
the two preceeding rounds, a round index, and two dummy variables pt−1 ≤ 35
and pt−2 ≤ 35 indicating whether the price of the incumbent in the two preceeding
rounds was smaller than or equal to 35. The dummy variable pt−2 takes the value 1
only if not only pt−2 ≤ 35 but also pt−1 > 35. The results show that past prices in
general do not explain entry, but a price below 35 in fact leads to signiﬁcantly less
entry in the consecutive round. If the price below 35 is followed by a larger price,
entry rates recover immediately: pt−2 ≤ 35 is not signiﬁcant. The regression also
14shows that entry rates decrease over time and that there is more entry in the ﬁrst
experiment. This last result is not surprising as there are four potential entrants





pt−1 ≤ 35 -0.2343** (0.1026)
pt−2 ≤ 35 -0.0673 (0.0847)
Round -0.0234*** (0.0072)
Dummy 3 Markets 0.4077*** (0.1032)
Dummy 1 Buyer -0.0832 (0.1195)
Constant 0.7378*** (0.1975)
Table 3: Regression Coeﬃcients: Number of Entrants. Standard Error in Brackets. *** Denotes Signiﬁcance at
the 1% Level, ** at the 5% Level and * at the 10% Level.
4.3 Consumers’ Strategies
Let us next consider consumers’ decisions and start again with the observations
from the ﬁrst experiment. We cannot say much about consumers’ reaction to actual
monopoly prices, because ﬁrms rarely set them. Alternatively we consider con-
sumers’ reaction to high prices larger or equal to 90: in the ﬁrst experiment there
are 15 of such high prices set by a monopolist. In these cases, monopolists in the ﬁrst
experiment sell only 4.13 units on average compared to 5.76 units of monopolists
with prices below 90.15 The values for the second experiment are very similar (see
Table 2).
To validate this descriptive result, we again estimate a simple OLS regression ex-
plaining the quantity sold by a monopolist with the monopolist’s price, a dummy
15Nevertheless, setting p>90 pays oﬀ for the monopolist, although not statistically signiﬁcant.
Average proﬁts with p ≥ 90 are higher (344.67 points) than with p<90 (318.24 points).
15variable indicating whether this price is above or below 90, and two dummy variables
separating the treatments (see Table 4). The results show a price at or above 90 has
a weakly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the quantity sold, whereas there is no general
relationship between the price and the sold quantity. The treatment dummies have




p ≥ 90 -1.1039* (0.5899)
Dummy 3 Markets 0.3250 (0.4174)
Dummy 1 Buyer -0.0566 (0.4072)
Table 4: Regression Coeﬃcients: Sold Quantity of an Incumbent Monopolist. Standard Error in Brackets. ***
Denotes Signiﬁcance at the 1% Level, ** at the 5% Level and * at the 10% Level.
Result 2 Consumers buy less than predicted by the market equilibrium when a mo-
nopolist charges them a high price even if the price is below their willingness to
pay.
This evidence, however, does not refer to monopoly prices occurring immediately
after predatory prices but to relatively high prices in general. In a next step, we
therefore consider more speciﬁcally the reaction of consumers to price increases of
the incumbent monopolist after low competitive prices in the past. To test this
hypothesis we again use a weaker deﬁnition of low prices (p ≤ 35) instead of strictly
predatory prices.
With this weaker deﬁnition and taken all three treatments together, we ﬁnd 39 cases
which fulﬁll the following conditions: In round t a consumer was oﬀered the product
at a price pt ≤ 35 by any ﬁrm. In round t + 1 this market is a monopoly and the
monopolist charges a higher price in t+1 than the lowest price that was set in this
market in t either by the incumbent or any entrant. Our ﬁrst hypothesis implies that
consumers buy less than 6 units in such situations. This is not the case. In only 18%
16of these situations consumers buy less than 6 units. Thus, buyers only relatively
rarely react to the price increase after a low price with an immediate reduction of
demand.
Result 3 Consumers do not condition their demand on lower prices in the imme-
diate past.
Finally we ﬁnd very interesting evidence for consumers’ strategies which are not
covered by standard theory. First of all, we observe 83% of the consumers in markets
I and II in the treatment 3Markets regularly buying from the more expensive ﬁrm.
Such expensive trades occur in 18.5% of the buyer decisions. If consumers decide
to buy some units from a more expensive high-cost ﬁrm, they spend on average
about 18 points more than if they had bought the same quantity from the (cheaper)
ﬁxed seller. In the post-experimental questionnaire, 44.4% of the consumers acting
in markets I or II explain this as their strategy to make the mobile ﬁrms enter the
market again in order to enforce competition.
3Markets 1Buyer 2Buyers
Buy expensive? 83.3% 62.5% 60.0%
Mentioned in questionnaire? 44.4% 12.5% 70.0%
Extra expenses = q ∗ ∆p 18.03 17.01 18.21
Table 5: Buyers Decisions
The above result does not change substantially when we consider the data from
the second experiment. The share of consumers buying from the more expensive
ﬁrm is 62.5% in the one-buyer treatment and 60.0% in the two-buyers treatment.
Neither the diﬀerence between the one-buyer treatment and the ﬁrst experiment, nor
the diﬀerence between the two treatments of the second experiment is statistically
signiﬁcant in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. Also
the comparison of losses due to expensive trades (see Table 5) shows no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence.
17Result 4 Consumers are willing to pay a higher price to the mobile ﬁrms to main-
tain long run competition.
5 Conclusion
We conducted two experiments testing two common assumptions regarding the like-
lihood of recoupment of losses after an incuments’ predatory pricing. In particular,
we consider consumers’ and entrants’ reaction if the incumbent monopolist returns
to high prices after a phase of predatory pricing. Our data shows that consumers
are in fact foresighted and willing to sacriﬁce some of their short run welfare in
order to enhance competition over time. To some extend, they refuse to buy at mo-
nopolistic prices. Entrants react only in the very short run to predation by leaving
the market but enter soon again. For a good part our experiment made use of the
subjects in their real life quality as consumers. Thus, our core results referring to
consumers’ behavior can taken relatively literally. We recommend our results about
ﬁrms’ behavior rather as a starting point to ﬁnd out more about real life decision
making.
The ﬁrst key result regarding consumers reducing the quantity bought from a monop-
olist charging them a high price seems to contradict economic conventional wisdom
and the deﬁnition of willingness to pay itself. Yet, it seems plausible that consumers
develop a sense for an ’appropriate’ price for commodities they are familiar with.
Even if they would be willing to pay more in general, they would not want to pay
more than this appropriate price. This explanation may be backed by the perceiv-
able stability of prices of certain consumer goods such as computers, where price
levels seem to remain constant over times despite sometimes spectacular changes in
performance, quality or technology. A second explanation relates to the results of
ultimatum games already mentioned above: consumers form realistic beliefs about
the ﬁrms’ costs and, thus, about the diﬀerence between these costs and their own
willingness to pay. If the monopolist then charges a price that implies a very unfair
distribution of this diﬀerence, consumers’ reluctance to buy is in line with responder
behavior in ultimatum games rejecting very unequal oﬀers.
18The result that consumers are ready to pay a higher price to the mobile ﬁrms to
maintain long run competition might be driven by the strong market power of con-
sumers in our experiment as there are only one or two of them in one market. The
situation in our laboratory experiment, however, corresponds quite well with the
situation in many professional markets: suppliers in business-to-business trade re-
lationships are often confronted with a demand side comprising only a few large
buyers. Such buyers then in fact have strong incentives to maintain long-run com-
petition at the supply side.
Finally, our experiment generally motivates further research in market behavior.
Even though the structure of the experimental markets in the ﬁrst of our two ex-
periments is far from trivial we ﬁnd that participants are well able to make rational
decisions in this framework. This hopefully encourages further experimental research
in complex situations with several diﬀerently informed and equipped agents.
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